Hello @Shoefert7, this is a repeat of #3979. Proton is not a security barrier and doesn't pretend to be with half taken measures. If security is a concern for you, then you should utilize stronger isolation tools to separate Steam and all games from the rest of your system, not just Proton.
proton experimentalx1 2025-12
While testing multiple Proton prefixes, I noticed that Windows applications running under Proton can enumerate significant parts of the host Linux filesystem, including:
Real user home directory paths
Desktop session logs (sddm, xsettingsd, KDE activity logs)
Baloo index database
Kernel and bootloader files from /boot
External drive paths under /run/media/
GPU and hardware details
Absolute Linux host paths included in Proton/Steam logs
This appears across multiple Proton versions and multiple game prefixes.
Although this does not provide write access, it exposes a large amount of host system metadata to any Windows application running inside Proton.
Affected Proton Versions
Proton Experimental
Likely applies to all Proton builds that map Z:\ to the full host filesystem
Environment
Linux (x86_64)
Steam library on secondary drive (/mnt/.../SteamLibrary)
GPU: NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3060
Prefixes tested: 489830, 1716740, and several others
Steps to Reproduce
Install any Windows game using Proton.
Launch once to generate the prefix.
On the host, run:
grep -R "/home" "<STEAM_LIB>/steamapps/compatdata/" | head
grep -R "Linux" "<STEAM_LIB>/steamapps/compatdata/" | head
grep -R "NVIDIA" "<STEAM_LIB>/steamapps/compatdata/" | head
Observe that the output includes host home directory content, session logs, /boot data, kernel configs, activity databases, and hardware info.
Repeat with other prefixes — exposure is consistent.
Redacted Evidence (Safe Examples)
Z:\home<USER>.local\share\kactivitymanagerd\resources\database
Z:\home<USER>.local\share\baloo\index
Z:\home<USER>.local\share\sddm/xorg-session.log
Z:\boot\vmlinuz-6.12.60
Z:\boot\config-6.12.60
Z:\boot/grub/x86_64-efi/.mod
sD3DDevice="NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3060"
Impact
A malicious or compromised Windows application could:
Fingerprint the host system
Enumerate personal user directory structure
Read session logs, activity metadata, and Baloo index files
Inspect kernel and bootloader metadata
Identify external drive mounts and user documents
This reduces Proton’s isolation and creates a Low-severity privacy / information disclosure condition.
Expected Behavior
Proton prefixes should ideally avoid exposing:
/home/ subdirectories unrelated to Steam or the game
/boot and bootloader files
External drive paths
Desktop session logs
unless absolutely required for game compatibility.
Suggested Mitigation
Restrict or filter Z:\ mapping
Provide a “hardened prefix” option with reduced host visibility
Limit exposure of non-essential host directories
Conclusion
This is a systemic privacy issue affecting multiple Proton prefixes.
It does not provide privilege escalation, but it exposes host metadata and user information to Windows applications in ways users may not expect.
Thanks for reviewing — I’m happy to provide more redacted samples if needed.